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ABSTRACT 
A natural economic interpretation of Prospect Theory is that people have preferences that 
are risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains. Thus, according to this interpretation 
of the theory, i ndividuals in an exchange economy facing only losses in wealth, would 
have concave preferences as opposed to the usual convex preferences. That is ,  if 
individuals could engage in trade that would reduce the magnitude of expected losses and 
change the variance associated with losses, they would have a tendency to seek higher 
variance and perhaps be wil ling to do so at the cost of a reduction of expected value of 
wealth. Such individuals would be willing to sell insurance at prices below the expected 
value. With concave preferences all competitive equilibria have allocations at the 
boundaries of the Edgeworth Box. Experimental markets were constructed to determine 
if such behavior could be observed. The results are that risk seeking behavior is 
observed in many people. Furthermore, the propensity toward risk seeking in markets is  
consistent with answers given to questionnaires involving hypothetical choices among 
lotteries. The propensity toward risk seeking appears to be reduced with experience. In 
one sense the data are strongly supportive of Prospect Theory but in another sense the 
data are not. The evidence suggests that preferences in the market setting  are not labile 
and that the risk seeking propensities are not a result of delicate framing effects . The 
preferences revealed in the market seemed to be a property of the people and not simply 
a property of their decision processes as required by Prospect Theory. 
EXCHANGE ECONOMIES AND LOSS EXPOSURE: EXPERIMENTS EXPLORING 
PROSPECT THEORY AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKET ENVIRONMENTS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Mikhail Myagkov and Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
August 1 995 
Recent years have found attempts to integrate ideas from a psychology research tradition with 
ideas from economics. The integration is difficult because the purposes of the two scientific 
enterprises differ and the methodologies differ. Nevertheless, the lessons from one approach can 
sometimes find applications in the other. This paper is an attempt to accomplish such an 
intellectual arbitrage by merging experimental methods from economics with theory suggested by 
psychology. 
The central focus of the experiments reported below is a psychological theory, called prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1 979 ), which has received substantial attention in the decision 
literature (Camerer, 1 995). The substance of prospect theory is the process of individual decision 
making as opposed to a substance of market activity and price formation typical of economics. 
For the most part economists have not been interested in the process of individual decisions. 
Instead, economics has proceeded on the assumption that the consequences of the individual 
decision making process, whatever they might be, will become manifest in the form of an 
individual preference relation . Thus, individual choices will be reflections of the attitudes that are 
sµmmarized by the concept of a preference. 
The individual in economics is captured by a preference relation over states of the world. By 
contrast the individual in psychology is a complex of processes that might be subject to any 
number of influences that are sometimes summarized by a concept of framing. Consistency such 
as transitivity does not fol low from psychological theory. Individuals can order things if asked to 
do so, but the ordering is labile and may bear no relationship to choices. In fact, it is not even 
clear if the concept of a preference is relevant from the point of view of prospect theory. Tversky, 
Sattath and Slovic ( 1 988,  p.383) put the issue well, "If different elicitation procedures produce 
different orderings of options, how can preferences and values be defined? And in what sense do 
they exist?" In summary, the substance of research from psychology is that preferences are labile 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1 986; Kahneman and Tversky, 198 1  ) because the process used by 
individuals to make decisions is subject to subtle framing effects. Thus while the processes used 
by individuals may be stable the existence of a summarizing characteristic of an individual such as 
a relatively stable or unchanging (non labile) preference is denied. 
The apparent differences between the psychological view of the individual and the economic view 
of the individual seem to emerge from three sources. First, prospect theory is about a process of 
decision and not necessarily about a preference that exists as some stable or constant property of 
an individual. The principles of the psychological model address the nature of the steps that occur 
when a process of decision is invoked. Secondly, the theory addresses one time decisions as 
opposed to repeated decisions or perhaps even "substantially considered" decisions that might 
take place i n  markets. Third, the sources of data are questionnaires and interviews as opposed to 
the market choices that are typical of data in economics. Furthermore the purpose of the 
questionnaires is not to measure some property of an individual (such as the slope of an 
indifference curve) as would be the case in economics; the purpose is to demonstrate properties 
of a decision making process that might produce substantially different decisions under slightly 
altered conditions. Thus, a tension between the two disciplines can easily result from a lack of 
realization that they are focused on different aspects of behavior and different sources of data. 
The purpose of the research reported here is to ask if prospect theory and the methods used to 
support it, can be employed to produce a model that captures data in a purely economic context. 
The research cannot be viewed as a test of prospect theory as developed by psychologists because 
it is being applied to a context and in a manner that differs substantially from what the originators 
. of the theory intended. The differences are so dramatic that it might be more appropriate to refer 
to the theory that is to be applied here as "extended prospect theory" rather than prospect theory 
in order to emphasize that the liberties taken with the theory reside entirely with the· present 
authors and not with the psychologists that are proponents of the theory.1 The "extended
prospect theory" is a theory of preferences as opposed to prospect theory, which is a theory of 
decision making process. 
Exchange economies were created in which only losses can occur. If the principles of prospect 
theory are assumed to dictate properties of a stable individual preference as opposed to a property 
of the process used to make decisions, then the (extended and modified) theory has definite 
consequences for what should be observed. More precisely, prospect theory implies concavity of 
indifference curves in the loss domain as opposed to the usual convexity assumption of 
economics. With the usual convexity assumptions violated the competitive equilibria in an 
exchange economy have distinct properties if the equilibria exist. The research reported here 
inquires whether or not those properties are observed. 
The second section of the paper out! ines relevant aspects of ("extended") prospect theory and the 
questions to be posed by the research. The third section of the paper contains the details of the 
experimental environments . The forth section contains a specification of the models that are 
'Several involved email conversations serve to emphasize that the psychologists c laim that the theory as they use
it makes no clear predications under the conditions of the experiments reported in this paper . (1 )The incentives are 
such that subjects participate to earn money so al l  lolleries would be viewed as gains and no asymmetries in  
behavior should be observed. (2) Prospect theory is a theory of choice and not a theory of exchange. Exchange 
involves a procedural invariance that is not part of prospect theory. (3) The exchange environment is complex and 
with each trade a difference reference point can be established. Prospect theory has yet to deal with the problem of 
multiple reference points. 
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needed to produce predictions about market behavior. The fifth section contains the results. The 
sixth section of the paper contains the results of some special experiments that were conducted to 
check the theoritical coherence (or robustness) of the results reported in  the body of the text. 
These experiments help eliminate some obvious alternative hypotheses that might be used to 
explain the pattern of observed results. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
An appendix contains the instructions used in the experiments. 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A fundamental difference exists between prospect theory and the traditional expected utility 
hypothesis as it is applied in economic context. The expected utility hypothesis rests on the . 
proposition that choices are made as if there exists a preference relation over lotteries over final 
states. It is as if the final outcome is the source of value and choices reflect a process of 
optimization modulated by attitudes toward risk. By contrast, prospect theory does not proceed 
on the presumption that a preference exists for final states. Individual decisions reflect 
optimization based on values but these values rest upon changes of states from some reference 
point, which for purposes of discussion, could be viewed as a status quo. Furthermore, the value 
function is postulated to have a very distinct shape. 
Briefly put, prospect theory rests on four axioms. 
(i) Decision utilities. Decisions reflect a maximization based upon decision utilities. 
(ii) Reference dependence. The carriers of decision utilities are changes in states (prospects) as 
opposed to outcomes or final states. These changes are relative to some outcome called the 
reference point. 
(iii) Loss aversion. The decision utility function is steeper in the losses than in the gains. That is, 
the negative of a given movement in the loss direction from the reference point outweighs a 
positive of an equal movement in the gain direction. 
(iv) Diminishing sensitivity. The decision utility function is convex in the loss domain and 
concave in the gain domain .  
The theory has not been systematically applied to market environments but it has been the 
foundation for an alternative to the expected utility hypothesis as a descriptive theory of decisions. 
By implication, since the expected utility hypothesis is routinely used in economics, the theory 
might serve as an alternative foundation for market models. Exactly how one might apply the 
theory is not clear since the concept of a reference point in a rapidly moving market situation is 
itself not clear and to date there is no substantial evidence that prospect theory, as articulated by 
psychologists, is applicable to markets . However, some claims have been reported in the 
literature (Kahneman and Tversky, I 986; Kahneman and Tversky, 1 99 1 ;  Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler 1 990) that traces of phenomena predicted by the theory, have been detected. 
The approach taken in this research is to create a market in which only "losses" can be realized 
and to study the resulting market behavior. Subjects were paid a flat amount of money ($60) in 
cash before the experiment began, which they kept during the course of the experiment. Once in 
the experiment they could only lose. Literally, they paid money to the experimenter. The amount 
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of loss depended upon the decision they made to buy and to sell lotteries, which were the 
functional equivalent of insurance. 
Each individual was given an initial endowment of units of lottery (insurance) which could be 
sold for cash. Or, if the individual wished (s)he could use cash to buy units of lottery(insurance) 
from other individuals. The setting was that of an exchange economy to which a standard 
competitive model might be applied. If individuals were risk averse then the indifference curves 
would take the usual convex properties and the competitive equilibria would necessarily  be of one 
class. If individuals were risk seeking then the indifference curves would take a concave property 
and the competitive equilibria would have a boundary property of a different class. Intuitively 
speaking, if the indifference curves of the Edgeworth Box are convex then the competitive . 
equilibria tend to h ave an interior property and if the indifference curves are concave then the 
competitive equilibria tend to take a boundary property. The following sections of the paper 
make these properties precise. 
A day or two prior to the experiment, subjects were given a classroom questionnaire to complete. 
This questionnaire contained choices between lotteries similar to those that were used in  
Kahneman and Tversky ( 1 979) to demonstrate a risk seeking propensity in the loss domain. 
Thus, a measurement similar to the ones used by psychologists was taken. The purpose was to 
compare behavior as revealed in the questionnaire with behavior revealed in the markets. 
The following four general questions are posed for research. 
( 1) Is there any consistent equilibration behavior observed within and across experimental 
markets? Unlike many previous market studies, the preferences explored in the experiments 
reported here have not been induced. If the reference point changes depending upon the context 
of the decision then preferences might exhibit labile properties and as a result the markets might 
be erratic. 
(2) Can market adjustments be associated with the equilibrium predications of the competitive 
model? As will be discussed later, the competitive model contains reasonably precise predictions 
about market behavior. However, there are very few studies in which the underlying parameters 
might not be convex. How the markets might behave under such circumstances is a question of 
general interest. 
(3) If patterns of equilibration are observed do they imply the existence of risk averse people , do 
they imply the existence of risk seeking people or do they imply the existence of both? The 
standard model typically assumes that people will be risk averse while a reasonable application of 
prospect theory would produce people that are risk seeking. Is risk seeking in the losses a 
property of individual preferences? Such a discovery would be of special interest because subjects 
in market experiments are generally observed exhibiting risk avoiding behavior (sealed bid 
experiments and speculation experiments are typical) .  
(4) Is there any relationship between answers to the questionnaires and the behavior exhibited in 
the markets? Do the questionnaires produce measurements that predict behavior in the context of 
operating markets? Do questionnaires capture a property of an individual as opposed to a process 
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of decision? Psychologists typically do not view the questionnaire as measuring a property of an 
individual and instead view it as a demonstration of the operation of certain aspects of a decision 
process. Economists are typically skeptical of any methodology in which questionnaires are used, 
so the question is of relevance along at least two dimensions. 
3 .  EXPERIMENT AL ENVIRONMENT, DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
A total of ten experiments were conducted. The first nine of them ( as summarized in Table 1 ) 
were held under identical economic and incentive environments. Experiments are indexed by the 
date of the experiment. The tenth one was a "control" experiment. Its purpose and design will be 
discussed in the "Results" section of the paper. Until then we discuss only first nine experiments. 
Each experiment involved six to ten subjects. Subjects for some experiments were recruited from 
the California Institute of Technology and the experiments were conducted at the Caltech 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Poli�ical Science. Other subjects were recruited 
from classes at the University of Southern California and the experiments were conducted at the 
USC Experimental Economics Laboratory. 
Subjects participated in one or two identical experiments. In all but 0324 and 0509 experiments 
the subjects were first-time participants. We call them "inexperienced subjects" ( see Table 1 ) . All 
of the subjects who were used in 0324 and 0509 experiments were second-time participants ( 
"experienced subjects") recruited from subject pools of one of the previous experiments with the 
first-time participants. None of the subjects had experience in experiments prior to the 
experiments reported here. 
The economic and incentive environment was as follows. Subjects were given $60 cash before 
the beginning of the experiment (they were handed the money in cash).2 They were told that the
money was theirs but as a result of the experiment they could lose some of it. They were told that 
the amount of the loss would depend upon the decisions they would make during the market and 
on the outcome of a roll of dice. The word "loss" was used in the instructions in much the same 
way as it is used in these paragraphs. 
In the economic environment there were two goods that could be traded. Each subject was told 
that (s)he faced two possible losses: Loss A and Loss B. That is, Total loss = Loss A +  Loss B .  
Each individual was given an initial endowment of variable M and X. The initial endowment of M 
was m0 =· 1 000 and the initial endowment of X was x0 = 20 units. For trading purposes M could
be viewed as cash on hand and X was units of inventory . The final loss exposure for a period of 
trading was 
Loss A = < $20 - ( 1 1 1 00) m > and 
Loss B = <0 {Prob 1 /2 }  or $40 - x {Prob 1 /2)> 
2 The instructions say "For your agreement to participate you will be paid $60.00." This was handed to them in  
cash. Then subjects were infonned that participation involved the possibility of losing a portion of  their money. 
The experiment was designed in such a way that no one could lose more than the $60 that they had in their hand. 
No one could sel l more than the inventory they had and no one could spend more than the cash on hand that they 
were al located. The parameters chosen guarantee l imitation on possible losses. 
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where m i s  the amount of M held at the end of a period and x is the amount of X held at the end 
of the period. 
As can be seen the variable M is l iterally money embedded in a loss framework and the variable X 
is a quantity of insurance. The expected value of Loss B offset from a one unit i ncrease in  X is 
$0.50. S ince the value of one unit of M is $0.01 the tradeoff that leaves total expected loss 
unchanged is 50 units of M for one unit of X.  That is,  the risk neutral price of X should be $0.50. 
Subjects were trained to participate in a multiple unit double auction (MUDA) as implemented 
through a computerized market. Standard training procedures were fol lowed. The variable M as 
defined appeared as cash on hand and X was inventory. 
Subjects in  USC participated in  three ( in one in Caltech ) practice market periods without payoff 
or exposure. These were used to test and train subjects about the accounting and how the 
markets functioned. The practice periods were followed by real periods in which the outcomes 
or final holdings ( m and x ) represented actual loss exposures. Each period the endowments 
were reset to the initial levels and no carryovers were allowed. At the end of several real periods 
one period was chosen at random (One of the subjects rolled dice.) and the lotteries that resulted 
from the trading during  that period were actually played (Once again a subject rolled the dice.). 
The losses were collected from the subjects and they were allowed to go.3
The instructions and accounting forms are included in the appendix. Subjects first read the 
instructions and then were asked to answer the questions in an exercise that in essence tested their 
understanding of the content of the instructions. After the first two experiments a subject 
selection procedure was implemented. More subjects were recruited than were necessary -
typically four or five extras. The first ten subjects that correctly answered all questions were 
allowed to participate. All other subjects were paid $5.00 and were dismissed. This procedure 
was introduced to save time in the administration of the experiment and thereby have the 
opportunity to conduct more periods. 
A questionnaire was administered to the entire classes from which subjects were later recruited. 
No reference to the questionnaire was made during the experiment or was it associated with the 
experiment in any other way. 
The questionnaire itself is included as Appendix 1 .  The questions themselves include the relevant 
questions form Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979). As can be seen from the Appendix they are of the
form 
"What would you prefer to lose: $50 for sure or $ 1 00 with probabil ity = 1 12 ?" 
"What would you prefer to win: $200 for sure or $400 with probability = 1 12?" . 
.i Under conditions of the expected uti lity hypothesis this compound lottery has no influence on behavior. The 
implications such a compound lottery for various forms of prospect theory or even extended prospect theory are 
only a matter of speculation at this time. The hypothesis maintained throughout the analysis in this paper is that 
the compound lottery does not influence the revealed preference for the l otteries at each period. Of course, as the 
authors of "extended prospect theory" we are free to do what seems to us to be most natural and convenient. 
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An i ndividual that prefers a lottery to the expected values of the lottery is exhibiting risk seeking 
type of answers. The stylized fact that has emerged from the Kahneman and Tversky research is  
that people are risk seeking in the losses. The data in support of this stylized fact are almost 
exclusively answers to questionnaires . 
4. MODEL
The model that will be applied to guide the analysis will be the general competitive equilibrium for 
an exchange economy. It i s  well known that this model is reasonably accurate under conditions in 
which preferences are induced and thus can be assumed to be known and fixed (Noussair, Plott 
and Riezman 1 995). Furthermore, it is known that the predictions of the model are also accurate 
under preference conditions that produce market instability (Plott and George 1 992). Thus the 
analysis will rest on a general assumption that regardless of the preferences that may be present in 
the economies, the markets will seek the competitive equilibrium as long as one exists. Of course 
under the conditions of the experiments reported here the preferences are not known. and
according to the psychology model might not be fixed or might not even exist; and, if preferences 
do exist in the form suggested by the model from psychology, extended prospect theory, then they 
will exist in a form that can cause market instability in the sense that individuals will always want 
to move to a boundary of an opportunity set. In this section the model will be developed under 
several assumptions about what preferences might be. 
As will be demonstrated in this section, the patterns of equilibrium behavior under different 
assumptions about preferences can differ dramatically. The analysis will first focus on the case in 
which all individuals are either risk averse, all risk seeking or all risk neutral. The primary focus 
will be on the shapes \')f indifference curves and the implied demand curves under conditions of 
competition. The analysis wil l  then address cases in which different numbers of individuals might 
be risk averse (RA) and risk seeking (RS) and the related problems of equilibrium. 
The key distinction for theory is the axiom of risk seeking in the losses. If individuals choose to 
maximize expected (decision) uti l i ty and if individuals are risk seeking in the losses then individual 
indifference curves are concave to the origin instead of convex. In such case the individuals have 
an incentive to move to a corner solution of a budget set at any given set of prices. If individuals 
are risk averse then they might want to move to the boundary of an opportunity set under some 
prices but there always exist prices at wh ich they would want to remain on the interior of the 
opportunity set. The consequences wil l  be for competitive equilibria to have certain boundary 
cases if the agents in the experiment are risk seeking while interior equilibria can also exist if the 
agents are risk averse. This special property of the equil ibria wi l l  form the bases for the 
evaluation of resul ts .  
The first proposi tion to be established is the re lationships among assumptions about risk seeking 
propensities, risk aversion and the shapes of indi fference curves. From the point of view of the 
model the individual must choose a combination of two commodities, M and X. Preferences over 
these two commodities reflect the fact that different combinations dictate different lotteries over 
monetary losses that the individual must experience. Different indifference curves for m and x 
(the final holdings of M and X respectively) wil l  resul t  from different assumptions about the 
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characteristics of an individual's preferences over these resulting lotteries, if indeed a concept of 
preference i s  relevant to attitudes toward lotteries- recall in some interpretations of prospect 
theory individuals do not have preferences in the form used by economics and employed here. 
The following notation is used hereafter : 
M = the notation for the numeraire 
m0 = the initial endowment of M
m = the quantity of m held at the end of a period 
X = the notation for the commodity 
x0 = the initial endowment of X
x = the quantity of X held at the end of a period 
p' y= the derivative of the function F(.) with respect to the variable y .  
The lotteries defined by the choice of m and x are Loss A for sure and Loss B with a .5 
probability. These prospects can be recombined into a choice of lotteries dictated by a choice of x 
and m, and are of the form: 
probability .5 { loss = $(20-m/1 00) } 
probability .5 { loss =$(60-m/l 00 - x) } 
so the expected value of the loss is 40 - mil 00 - .5 x .  
Three general background assumptions will be used throughout. 
(a) The commodity space is two dimensional as characterized by the variables M and X, which 
characterize exposure to.lotteries of monetary losses or changes in wealth from some current 
value w. M takes values o:::;m:;2000 and X takes values 0::::; x ::::; 40. 
(b) Individuals preferences over lotteries are as if the individuals wished to maximize the expected 
value of a (twice differentiable) utility function of money. 
Assumptions (a) and (b) can be summarized by an assumption that the individuals act as if they 
wished to chose m and x to maximize 
EUi (w,m,x) = 0.5 Ui (w, mil 00 - 20) + 0.5 Ui ( w, m/ 1 00 - 20 + x - 40)
where w is the value of current wealth. Ordinari ly the expected util ity hypothesis would assume 
that the function was of the form U( w+�w). Here the distinction is made because of the
following assumption. 
(c) The relevant reference point for purposes of appl ication of prospect theory is w.  Furthermore 
the analysis will suppress w since it is assumed to be the same throughout the experiment. 
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Of course this suppression is not really consistent with psychological reasoning since the reference 
point is presumed to be context dependent and thus might take any form at all in such a complex 
environment as a market. 
Indifference Curves. 
The proposition to be stated below demonstrates that the indifference curves in  two dimensional 
space, under the general assumptions above, are concave to the origin if the individual is risk 
seeking as suggested by prospect theory; If the individual is risk averse the indifference curves 
will have the usual convexity property and if the individual is risk neutral then the indifference 
curves will be straight lines with a well defined slope. 
PROPOSITION 1 .  Consider a utility function satisfying the general assumptions (a), (b) and (c) 
above. If 
1 .  U' (z)>O for any z .
2. U"(z)<O for any z<O if a subject is Risk-Averse in losses.
3. U" (z) > 0 for any z < 0 if a subject is Risk-Seeking in losses.
4. U' (z) = 1 and U" (z) = 0 if a subject is Risk-Neutral
then in the MN case the indifference curves of the final holdings of M and X satisfy the fol lowing 
properties: (where subscripts represent partial derivatives) 
1 .  x' m < 0 for any m : 0<m<20.
2. x" m > 0 (Convex) if a subject is Risk-Averse in negatives.
3. x" m < 0 (Concave) if a subject is  Risk-Seeking in negatives.
4 . x'm = -0.02 and x" m = 0 if a subject is Risk-Neutral .
SUPPORT. See Appendix 3 .  
The typical indifference curves for all types of subjects are shown in Figures la, 2 a  and 3a. For 
risk averse individuals the indifference curves must have the usual convex to the origin shape 
(Figure 1 a) . For risk seeking individuals the preferences are concave to the origin as shown in 
Figure 2a. For risk neutral individuals the curves are straight line with the designated slope of -
0�02 (Figure 3 a) .  Notice that the slopes of all curves are less than or equal to -0.02 regardless of 
attitudes toward risk of loss. 
Excess Demand Functions 
The analysis will ultimately lead to a consideration of various aspects of competitive equilibria. 
Useful tools to help one understand the possibilities under various conditions are the demand 
functions. Demand functions are solutions to the constrained optimization problem: 
MAX.m,x 0.5U(m/1 00 - 20) + 0.5U(m/ 1 00 - 20 + x - 40) 
subject to 
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m+P x � m0 + Px0 , O� m� 2000, O� x� 40, where m0= 1000, x0=20
P i s  the price of inventory X expressed in terms of units of M per unit of X. The initial 
endowments of M and X are designated by mo and xo. A similar problem exists where the lottery 
i s  the numeraire except in that case prices of M are stated in  terms of the number of units of X i t  
would take t o  buy one unit of M. A solution to the maximization problem produces the individual 
demand curves. 
Since the functional forms of the utility function are not specified, only the qualitative features of 
excess demand functions can be obtained. Some general properties of the excess demand 
functions will be discussed for all three cases of risk aversion, risk seeking and risk neutrality. 
Begin with a price of 50 in Figure 1 a. It is the diagonal line from the upper left to the lower right. 
This  price plays an important role in determination of the demand equations .  Any transactions 
made at a price of 50 preserves the expected value of initial endowments. In other words, a risk 
neutral person would be indifferent between buying or selling at that price. If the trade increased 
variance of final money a risk averse person would not move along this price line but a risk 
neutral person might and a risk seeking person would. 
First consider the excess demand functions of a risk averse individual and continue to study 
Figure la, which illustrates the solutions of the utility maximization problem. The demand 
functions derived from this exercise are of the form of the functions represented in Figure 1 b. If 
the price P is lower than 50 then by Proposition 1 ,  the quantity demanded above the initial 
endowment will be equal 20. In other words all risk averse subjects will be willing to buy 20 units 
of X to add to their initial endowment, which is equivalent to buying as much insurance as is 
possible. If the insurance cost is less than the expected value of the loss, a risk averse person will  
always buy. If the price is equal to 50 then the quantity demanded by a risk averse person i s  also 
equal to 20. The individual would prefer to spend the money an avoid the exposure to risk that i s  
implicit i n  a fair bet. At prices that range from 50 to p** (Figure la) the quantity demanded falls 
continuously from 20 to some negative q** (Figure 1 b ) .  At the low price the risk averse person 
is a buyer of insurance but as the price get high the purchases fall and if the price of insurance is  
high enough then in spite of the risk aversion the individual wil l  sell insurance. At prices from p** 
to +oo the individual has no use for the money because of the boundary on the values that m can 
take, and as a result the demand is goes from q** to 0 proportional to l/P. 
Figure 2a illustrates the solutions to the util ity maximization problem for a risk seeking individual 
and Figure 2b graphs the qual itative features of the resulting demand functions. At any price of 
50 or above a risk seeking individual will always be on the sellers side of the X market. A risk 
seeking individual prefers the risk and variance in wealth so would always prefer to take the 
money and assume the risk of a "fair bet" . Thus, at prices above 50 the risk averse person will 
always have an excess demand of -20. However, because of the constraints on the value of M 
their demand for X will increase from -20 to 0 proportional to 1/P as P increases. 
At some prices below 50 risk seeking ind ividual would participate as a seller of insurance. At 
a price slightly below 50, (s)he would prefer to take the cash and assume the risk. However there 
is a sufficiently low price, equal to p* (Figures 2a and 2b ), at which a risk seeking person is  
indifferent between -20 and 20. Such a price wil l  always exist because of the continuity of the 
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utility function. If the price is less than p* then the risk seeking individual will demand 20 units of 
X. At that p* the price of insurance is so low that the risk seeking individual will buy it because 
the increase in expected wealth more than compensates for the fact that the variance in wealth will 
fal l  as a resul t  of the purchase. 
All risk neutral subjects will be on the buyers side of the market if the price is lower than 50 and 
on the sellers side if the price is higher than 50. At the price equal to 50 they are indifferent 
between all points that are within the interval [ -20, 20 ]. Figure 3b presents a typical demand 
function of a risk neutral person. 
It is important to note that with only one exception the individual excess demand functions are
continuous. The only exception occurs in the case of the excess demand function of a risk
seeking person, which has one point of discontinuity at a price of p*. At that price the function
has two values: 20 and -20.
Competitive Equilibria. 
With the properties of the individual excess demand functions established the analysis can focus
on the possible properties of equilibria that can emerge from an exchange economy. Important to
this determination will be the relative numbers of risk averse (A), risk seeking (S) and risk neutral
(N) in "losses" individuals that happen to exist in the economy. Recall that preferences are not
controlled in these experiments and that the individual brings to the market whatever preferences
or attitudes that he or she has.
The problem, can be formally written within the framework of a J-person, two-goods, pure­
exchange economy. Thus consider J individuals A of whom are risk averse, S are risk seeking and
N are risk neutral in losses. The preferences and utilities are assumed and defined in Proposition
1 .
There are two goods in the system: "francs", denoted by M and "units of inventory", denoted by
. 
. 
X. Any individual is allowed to have 0 � X � 40 and 0 � M � 2000 in his possession. Extra
francs or units of inventory do not increase utility. The two goods have value in the sense that an
increase or either or both will decrease exposure to a monetary loss. Initial endowments are
denoted as mo and xo where m0 = 1 000 and x0= 20. The notation of price P is determined as an 
amount of francs used to acquire one unit of X.
Individual excess demand functions derived under the conditions of the economy are as described
in the paragraphs above. The attention now turns to equil ibria. The possibility of nonconvexities
makes any discussion of equilibria rather complex. In particular the existence of equilibria
depends upon a relatively delicate balanc ing of the number of individuals with different types of
preferences. The Walrasian dynamics drives the system in the consistent way but the price itself
might be supported only by a delicately balanced allocation. Recall that in the case of non convex
preferences there is a tendency to go to the boundaries . Since everyone wants on the boundary
(and all initial endowments are equal) the number of people that want to sell must exactly equal
the number of people that want to buy.
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Formally, a competitive equilibrium exists in the system if and only if there is a price pe at which 
total excess demand (D(p)=I:Qi(p), where Qi(p) is an individual excess demand) has a value of 0, 
D(pe)=O. Figures lb, 2b and 3b show that the shapes of the individuals excess demand curves 
depend on types of the individuals .  That implies that the shape of the total excess demand curve 
and the equilibrium price depend upon the relative numbers of risk averse, risk seeking and risk 
neutral individuals in the system. The following three propositions use the notion of the total 
excess demand to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and · 
to compute equilibrium prices under different relative N, S and A. Proofs of the Propositions can 
be found in the Appendix 3. 
PROPOSITION 3. If there are only Risk Averse subjects in the system (S=N=O) then under the 
conditions on the preferences and identical initial endowments a competitive equilibrium always 
exists at a price strictly higher than 50. 
PROPOSITION 4.  (S=O) If there are no Risk-Seeking subjects in the system then under the 
conditions on the preferences and identical initial endowments a competitive equilibrium always 
exists. Equilibrium price is higher than 50 if A>N and equal to 50 otherwise. 
PROPOSITION 5. Under the conditions on preferences, identical initial endowments and even 
number of subjects a competitive equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium price is lower than or 
equal to 50 if S :2: A+N and greater than or equal to 50 if S::;; A+N. Moreover, if S > A+N then 
equilibrium price is strictly lower than 50. 
The fol lowing two observations follow directly from the Propositions 3-5. 
Observation A .  Only individual maximum net trades should be observed if the equilibrium is at a 
price less than 50. That is, if the equilibrium price is lower than 50 then all individuals should 
trade the maximum of 20 units. 
Observation B .  The number of buyers should be equal to the number of sellers in the market if the 
equilibrium is at a price less than 50 . The market volume of net trades should be [20 (J/2)] at 
equilibrium prices less than 50 . 
The Table 2 summarizes the major results of this section . The equilibrium price predictions of the 
competitive model are listed conditional on the relevant environmental assumptions. 
It is important to note that the theoretical analysis proceeds on the assumption that there is always 
an even number of people who follow the expected utility hypothesis and either have risk 
avoiding, risk seeking or risk neutral preferences . If someone does not participate or if an 
individual has preferences that are substantial ly different from the ones postulated then the 
dynamics of the markets sti l l  could be similar to that postulated in Propositions 3-5 because of the 
limited influence one individual can have by virtue of the constraints on the budget set. Of course 
existence of equilibrium in the model is another thing and the presence of such individuals could 
force the system into an environment in which the equilibrium does not exist in the competitive 
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model. If for some reason an individual wants only a few units then delicate balancing of 
individuals is impossible and the logic applied to generate existence in the models applied here is  
destroyed. 
5. RESULTS
The time series of all periods of all nine experiments are shown in Figures 7- 1 5 .  Shown there are 
the contract prices as they occurred in  time. The vertical bars represent the change of periods. A 
large black vertical bar represents the change from the practice periods to the periods for which 
the consequences would result in actual losses. While the figures show all data including the 
practice periods, only the real payoff periods are considered in the data analysis discussed in thi s  
section. The practice session is  included only for i llustrative purposes. The horizontal dotted l ine 
is the reference price of 50. 
The impression from the figures is  that in all but one experiment transaction prices were 
consistently lower than 50 and that in most cases prices settled to some sort of an "asymptote". 
The only exception is experiment 050 1 .  The impression i s  supported by the first result. The 
importance of the result is that according to the model , the implication of such prices i s  that at 
least half of the subjects in the experiments were risk seeking. 
RESULT 1 .  The transaction prices tend to be no higher than the risk neutral level of 50. The 
estimated asymptote of such movements were lower than 50. 
SUPPORT. The first claim of result relies on the data presented in the Table 3. The numbers in 
the Table are average transaction prices across actual payoff periods and experiments. Notice 
that there are only seven exceptions to the statement of the result and six of these exceptions exist 
only in experiment 0501 ,  In many periods of several experiments the average prices were within 
one cent of the risk neutral price of 50 thereby suggesting the hypothesis that subjects were risk 
neutral and that subjective transaction cost would account for the difference. This possibility is 
discussed later in the paper. For now, it must be remembered that virtually all transactions were 
made below the risk-neutral level of 50 ( see Figures 7- 1 5). 
For the second claim of the result, the destination and the direction of the equi libration process 
must be determined. The destination and the direction of the price convergence was evaluated by 
the application of a simple dynamic model, [Noussair, Plott, Reizman, 1 995] . The model assumes 
that price (dependent variable) may start from a different origin for each experiment, but the 
convergence is assumed to be to a common asymptote in all experiments. Formally the model is  
as fol lows: 
Pit = BJ J DJ(  l /t) + . . .  + BJ KDK + B 2((t- l )/t) + Uit 
where i is the index of the experiment, Dj are dummy variables that take value l if i=j and value 0
otherwise, t is time measured in terms of experimental period number, K is number of 
experiments, Pit is the average price in period t of the experiment i, u is a random variable, 
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distributed normally with 0 mean. B Ii measures origin of the price convergence process and B2 is 
an asymptote. 
Data in Table 4 show ordinary least squares estimation of the model. The estimated asymptote 
was 46. 1 1  and the risk neutral equilibrium price was at 50. Thus, the statistical model suggests 
that the price equilibration was to the price lower than the risk neutral level of 50. • 
The next result is focused on the convergence process and the degree to which i t  can be described 
as being toward the competitive equilibrium . All experiments involved an even number of 
subjects so by Propositions 5 and 6 and under the general maintained hypothesis, a competitive
equilibrium existed in all nine experiments. Prices and final holdings should be considered. Price 
patterns were considered in Result 1 .  The conclusions about the destination of the price 
movement process, combined with the patterns of competitive equilibria predicted by the model, 
suggest the extent to which patterns of net changes of final holdings are consistent with the view 
that the process was converging toward a competitive equilibrium. It is important to .note that the 
result addresses a convergence process because none of the processes could be said to have 
perfectly equilibrated. 
RESULT 2 .  Market movement toward a competitive equilibrium was observed across 
. experiments. The 
propensity for movement toward competitive equilibrium quantities is more pronounced as 
subjects have experience in more than one experiment. 
· 
SUPPORT. The first step of the support is to show that a tendency of price equilibration in a 
sense of a falling variance of price, was observed across experiments . Data in Table 5 show that 
the standard deviations of the prices were lower in the final periods of every experiment , 
compared to earlier periods, thus suggesting price equilibration. 
The next step is to determine, if one of several patterns of competitive equilibria. predicted by the 
model was observed across experiments . The competitive model predicts a pattern of prices and 
closely related final holdings. We know from Result I that prices as well as the asymptotes of the 
process were no higher than 50 in all but one experiment. 
Observation A is that the equ il ibrium final holdings are at the boundaries if prices are below 50. 
Observation B is that in equilibrium the number of sel lers should equal the number of buyers given 
the transaction prices are less than 50 and the observation also contains a prediction for the total 
volume. Observations A and B as well as Result I imply that in equilibrium each subject should 
have bought or sold 20 units of inventory, thus making final holdings equal to 40 or 0. 
Data on final holding is a bit less decisive than on prices, but relevant statistics are in Table 6. 
Shown there are the numbers of individuals who increased or decreased their holding of X by 
various levels .  The last two periods of an experiment were averaged for each individual and used 
as the measure to indicate the individual's position. The numbers of buyers are approximately
equal to the numbers of sel lers ( 40 vs 38) ,  and we find fifty seven out of seventy eight people
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have moved half way ( at least nine units ) or more toward the boundaries . This i s  more than 
73% of the individuals .  
The fact that not al l  of the individuals have moved to the boundaries shows up again in the 
volume numbers. Data in Table 7 show the time series of net trade volumes across experiments. 
In five out of nine experiments the volumes were substantially lower than the predictions of the 
competitive model and there were no clear signs of volume convergence to the predicted 
quantities. The relevance of this phenomena will be discussed later in the paper where individual 
behavior of subjects will be considered. 
The subjects who participated in two experiments tended to have higher net changes of final 
holdings in the second experiment in which they participated. Data in Table 8 compare average ( 
of the last two periods ) final holdings of the subjects for the USC experiments: 03 1 6,03 17  ,0324 
and for the Caltech experiments : 050 1 ,0502,0505,0509. The first two experiments ( 03 1 6  and 
03 1 7 ) in the USC experiments and the first three experiments ( 0501 ,  0502, 0505) in the Caltech 
set involved inexperienced subjects. All of the subjects in the USC, 0324 and in Caltech, 0509 
had the experience of previous participation in one of the earlier experiments . First, notice that 
six of the seven subjects who came close to the boundaries ( bought or sold more than two-thirds 
of the theoretically predicted quantities ) during their first experience kept that tendency for their 
second participation. Secondly, fifteen of twenty subjects under consideration increased the 
absolute values of their final holding changes the second time of participation. Thus, the 
evidence for movement toward a competitive equilibrium allocation is stronger in markets in 
which subjects were experienced. 
In summary, price convergence receives substantial support but allocation results are less so. 
Movement toward the boundaries occurs, but in the USC experiments the movement is 
incomplete resulting in volumes that are less than the competitive prediction. While the evidence 
is thus mixed, we conclude that a tendency of convergence toward a competitive equilibrium was 
observed across experiments . • 
The next result states the implications of the particular competitive equilibrium observed, as 
related to the numbers of different types of preferences. As Proposition 6 states, because prices 
are so low, there must be more risk seeking people in the system than risk averse and risk neutral 
combined. Result 3 says that there are individuals that are risk seeking in the losses, but it also 
makes explicit the fact that such properties of individuals can be observed in market behavior. 
Later it will be shown that it is possible not only say that there were risk seeking people in the 
system but also separate them from risk averse people. 
RESULT 3. The number of risk seeking subjects in the experiments was no less then the number 
of risk averse and risk neural subjects combined. 
SUPPORT. Proposition 6 states that only in the cases in which the number risk seeking subjects 
is no less than the number of non risk seeking ones ( S :2: N+A), can the competitive equilibrium 
price be at some level which is strictly lower than 50. Average period prices (Table 3) as well as
econometric data (Table 4 ) demonstrate that that was the case in the experiments. Result 2
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states that the convergence was toward a competitive equilibrium. Thus, it is possible to apply 
Propositions 5 and 6 to the experimental data and conclude that the number of risk seeking 
subjects in the experiments was no lower then the number of non risk seeking ones.• 
The conclusion is consistent with the diminishing sensitivity axiom of prospect theory, which 
predicts such a behavior in losses. However, the price equilibration across experiments, identified 
in the previous paragraphs ,  has one major implication, which is very important for the discussion 
of the relevance of prospect theory for economics from a methodological point of view. Namely, 
equilibration suggests that, contrary to prospect theory as advanced by psychologists, preferences 
exist and do not exhibit labile properties depending on reference point changes. This issue will be 
pursued toward the end of the results section. 
The next result evolves from an inquiry that has two forms. First, do the questionnaires used 
extensively in psychological studies lead to measurements of properties of people that will be 
manifest in market behavior? The second form is a corollary to the first .  Is risk seeking in  the 
negatives a property of individual preferences or is  it a property of the way that people think 
about things? Is it a property of preference or is it a property of the process of preference 
formation? As it turns out the questionnaires have a biased property but nevertheless provide 
strong predictive powers about market behavior. Thus, one cannot reject the notion that the 
questionnaires measured a property of preference as opposed to a feature of cognition. 
The analysis will consist of three steps. First, the subjects will be classified as RA or RS according 
to their behavior in the experiments .  Secondly, the same classification will be completed according 
to their answers to the questionnaires. Comparison of two classifications will provide support for 
the statement of results. 
A classification of the subjects by their behavior in the experiments is developed by using the 
equilibrium patterns suggested by the model . Subjects can be classified into three different 
categories, according to their final holdings . Only two last periods of every experiment were 
used in the analysis. Data in Table 9 show the results of such a classification . 
1 .  Risk Seeking ("RS") - This class contains subjects who satisfy the following condition: 
They moved at least half way toward the "sellers" boundary on average, i .e .  they sold at least ten 
units of X on average in the last two periods of the experiment. 
2. Possibly Risk Averse ("RA") - This class contains subjects who satisfy the following
condition: 
They moved at least half way toward the "buyers" boundary on average, i .e .  they bought at least 
ten units of X on average in the last two periods in the experiment. 
The competitive model predicts (Propositions 5 and 6) that in equilibrium, when the prices are 
sufficiently lower than the risk neutral price, risk seeking people can demonstrate the same 
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behavior as risk averse people: buying units of inventory. On the other hand, if a subject is on the 
sellers' side of the market and prices are below 50 then that subject is exhibiting risk-seeking 
behavior. Thus, formally, the numbers in Table 9 represent lower bounds of the numbers of the 
risk seeking people in the experiments and the upper bounds of the numbers of the risk averse 
subjects. 
3 .  "?"- It is hard to say about subjects. This class contains subjects who did not demonstrate a 
"consistent pattern" of behavior. In other words, these were subjects who: 
i. may have been moving in a direction of the boundaries, but did not demonstrate any
pattern of consistency. 
i i . were trading around the status quo, instead of moving toward some boundary, but showed
no consistent behavior. 
iii . were not buying or selling anything at all .
iv .  demonstrated a mix of i ,  ii and iii. 
Data in Table 9 demonstrate the results of the classification. Notice that approximately two thirds 
of all subjects (53 out of 82) were classified as RS or RA and the other third was classified as"?". 
Since, as discussed in the previous paragraphs, those subjects who were classified as RA could in 
fact be RS if prices were sufficiently low , the results of such a classification should be interpreted 
to be that there was no less than 50% of the people in the experiments that were risk seeking. 
This classification is consistent with the claim of Result 3 that risk seeking accounts for a 
substantial proportion of behavior. 
The classification provides a possible insight about the weaknesses in the support for 
equilibration. Recall from the support of the Result 2 that the total net volumes of trades were 
lower than predicted by the competitive model. Now it becomes clear that such a phenomena is 
likely due to the great number of subjects who were classified as"?". The common feature of 
most of such subjects is that they did not move far from the status quo. In other words they all 
had low net volumes across periods and as a result they could not be classified as RA or RS . 
Data in Table 7 show that the net volumes were approximately 1 0-50% lower than ones predicted 
by the model. On the other hand one third of subjects were classified as"?", thus providing · 
support for the claim that the "?" subjects were responsible for low net volumes. 
A classification of the subjects according to their answers to the questionnaires was done. All of 
the subjects were asked to answer the following questions: What would you prefer to loose: 
For Sure With probability 
112 
1 $500 $ 1 000 
2 $20 $40 
3 $3000 $4000 (p= .8 )  
4 $7.50 $ 1 5  
5 $ 1  $2 
According to their answers they were qualified using two different types of classifications:  
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Type 1 classification: 
Risk-Averse - 3 or more answers "for sure" ; 
Risk-Seeking - 3 or more answers "with probability = 1 12" 
Type 2 classification: (according to the answers to single question) 
Risk-Seeking - Would prefer to loose $40 with probability = 1 12 instead of loosing $20 for 
sure. 
Questionnaires were completed by all 82 subjects who participated in the experiments. 
According to the Type 1 criteria 66(80%) were "Risk-Seeking" 
1 6(20%) were "Risk-Averse" 
According to the Type 2 criteria 6 1 (74%) were "Risk-Seeking" 
2 1 (26%) were "Risk-Averse" 
With the measurements above completed the result can now be stated. The essence of the result 
is that the questionnaires have predictive power about behavior in markets . 
RESULT 4 .  There is strong consistency between answers to the questionnaires and experimental 
market behavior. However, the questionnaire has a substantial bias that overestimates the number 
of risk seeking individuals relative to the number of risk averse individuals. [ The error rate of risk 
seeking answers in the questionnaire is greater than the error rate of risk averse answers to the 
questionnaire. That is, an individual responding in a risk averse manner in the questionnaire was 
more likely to behave that way (RA) in the experiment than was a person who was Risk-Seeking 
in the questionnaires.] 
SUPPORT. The numbers in Table 1 0  represent relationships between the experimental data and 
the data from the questionnaires. If only subjects who were classified as RA or RS are considered 
then the probability that a subject who appears to be RS according to the questionnaires would 
demonstrate the same kind of behavior in the experiment ( p(RSexplRSquest)) is equal to .65 ( .63 
for type 2 of classification). Similarly p(RAexplRSquest)=.35 ( .37) , p(RAexplRAquest)=.87 
( . 80), p(RSexplRAquest)=. 1 3( .20) . Two conclusions follow about relevance of the 
questionnaires for predicting market behavior. First, answers to the questionnaires do produce 
measurements that can be used as a rough pred iction of the behavior in the context of operating 
markets, since the probability of consistent ( with the answers) behavior is .73 . Secondly, the 
likelihood of a deviation in the experiment from the answer given to the questionnaire is two and a 
half times higher ( 35/ 1 3) for risk seeking subjects (questionnaire) rather than for risk averse ones 
(questionnaire). It is important to note that the resu lts are the same for both types of 
classification . In other words choice of either of the two different types of classification does not 
change the results. Finally, the fact that the number of RA people was likely overestimated and the 
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number of RS people was underestimated implies even stronger consistency between answers and 
actions than presented above. • 
6. RESULTS AND THEORITICAL COHERENCE: THREE TESTS
The.results as reported go beyond a simple reporting of statistics. There is an attempt to weave a 
sense in  which the statistics are consistent with the principles that support "extended prospect 
theory" as integrated with the competitive model. -Since the data do not perfectly fit the 
competitive model, as modified to include the possibility of risk seeking behavior in the negatives, 
there might be alternative explanations. In this section we discuss additional experiments that 
explore three possible alternative explanations of the data. Space limitations prevent any detailed 
reporting but these additional experiments can be used as some indication of the robustness of the 
major results reported in the body of the paper. These additional experiments will be referenced 
as "additional controls". 
· 
The motivation for the first additional control experiment was the fact that transaction prices in 
most experiments tend to be very close ( a penny below ) to the risk neutral level of 50.  In view 
of such data, a possibility exists that that the subjects were risk neutral and that transaction costs 
accounted for the observed lack of accuracy of the model. To test this hypothesis (risk neutrality) 
an additional control experiment (0509) was conducted. This experiment involved a ·special 
selection of subjects from those that had participated previously. Subjects were chosen that had 
previously demonstrated risk seeking behavior according to the model. Aside from the selection 
of subjects, the experiment was an exact replica of all previous experiments. All subjects who 
participated in experiment 0509 had already participated in one of the previous Caltech 
experiments: 050 1 ,  0502 or 0505. All but one of the subjects chosen for 0509 were those that 
could be classified as risk seeking as a result of their previous participation. Data in Table 3 
show that in the three previous experiments (050 1 ,0502 and 0505) prices were close to the risk 
neutral level of 50. Thus, if the subjects were risk neutral then the transaction prices in the 
experiment 0509 should be also near 50. On the other hand, if the existence of risk seeking 
in-dividuals interpretation of the data is correct , then, as the model implies, the prices in 
experiment 0509 should be significantly below 50. 
The last column in Table 3 presents transaction prices for the additional control experiment 0509. 
It is clear that the prices were not only below 50 but are far below ( about 20% ) the prices in the 
experiments 050 1 ,  0502 and 0505 . Thus the prices are out of the range of any previously 
observed transactions costs deviation from equilibrium. Since market prices were substantially 
below the risk neutral equilibrium, the model implies that there at least as many risk seeking 
subjects as there are risk averse and risk neutral combined, so the hypothesis about general risk 
neutrality can be rejected. 
A second additional control experiment (05 1 6) was conducted to explore the idea that the 
observed risk seeking behavior could be explained as a property of general risk seeking 
preference, as opposed to simply risk seeking in losses. If subjects change their risk seeking 
be�avior to risk averse behavior when the experimental conditions are formulated in terms of
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gains as opposed to l osses, then the hypothesis of general risk seeking preference can be rejected. 
Does the risk seeking behavior observed simply reflect the attitudes of individuals that prefer risk 
taking in general, or is it the case that preferences are different for gains as opposed to losses? 
The test was performed using an experiment with a translation of the origin of the payoffs to a 
"gains" environment. 
First, subjects were paid $ 1 0  up-front and were given 1000 units of money (m) and 20 units of 
inventory ( x )  as initial holdings. Secondly, their incentives to trade were formulated in terms of 
potential gains: 
Total Gain = Gain A + Gain B 
Gain A = < ( 1 / 100) m > and 
Gain B = < 0 { Prob 1 /2 }  or ( 1 00 cents )x { Prob 1 12 }  > . 
Thus the purchase of a unit of X is simply the purchase of a lottery that yields a 50:50 chance 
between 100 cents and 0. Note that for both types of design ( losses and gains ) the ex-ante 
expected amounts of money a subject could earn were the same. Thus, since the finai states of 
the world are the same under both conditions, stable preferences over final states of the world 
yield should produce behavior that is the same for both types of experiments. The nine subjects 
who were used in this second control experiment had participated in the first additional control 
experiment 0509 (One of the ten subjects that participated in 0509 could not return for the 
experiment 05 1 6). Recall ,  these subjects when participating in experiment 0509 demonstrated 
clear risk seeking behavior in losses as they had done in the previous experiments. Therefore, if 
no differences exist for the subjects between losses and gains, one would also expect to observe 
risk seeking behavior in the "gains" and thus prices should be above the "expected value' . Prices 
above the risk neutral level of 50 would reflect the buying efforts of risk seeking individuals who 
drive the price up because they enjoy the variance in wealth. On the other hand, if the subjects 
have asymmetric risk attitudes in the gains and losses, then the subjects would switch to the risk 
averse behavior when the lotteries are formulated in terms of gains. As a consequence , the 
transaction prices in the second additional control experiment (05 1 6) would be below the risk 
neutral level of 50. 
Figure 1 6  presents time series of transaction prices for the second additional control experiment 
(05 1 6) .  The horizontal l ine corresponds to the- risk neutral level of 50 cents. Notice tha! all 
transaction prices are below 50.4 There are an odd number of agents and if more than half are risk
seeking then the prices must necessari ly be above the fair lottery price of 50. Thus, the market 
measure suggests risk aversion on the part of subjects as opposed to risk seeking. This asymmetry 
in behavior is  supported at the individual level .  Three of the four subjects who demonstrated risk 
averse behavior in 05 1 6  (the gains) by sell ing the lottery at prices below the risk neutral price had 
exhibited strong risk seeking tendencies by sel ling insurance at a price below the risk neutral 
prices, when participating in 0509 (the loss ). These individuals exhibited clear asymmetric 
behavior by switching to risk averse behavior when the market consists of the same lotteries only 
4 The data are (period, average price, std.dcv . ) : (0,45,2. 1 5),  (I ,47, 1 .34 ), (2,48, .83), (3,48,1 .28), (4,48, .83),  
(5,48,.5), (6,48, .46), (7,48,.48). 
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transformed to the gains.5 Thus, the hypothesis that the subjects were risk seeking in  general and
exhibited no asymmetric behavior, can be rejected. 
A glance at the time series of all experiments suggests the motivation for a third set of additional 
control experiments. Notice that prices in all experiments tend to be below the equilibrium value 
of the model. This suggests the hypothesis that something about the experiments, unrelated to risk 
preferences, simply caused the markets to converge from below. A third set of four additional 
control experiments were performed but are not reviewed here in detail. The purpose of the 
experiments was to control for the hypothesis that the "natural path" of convergence of any 
market in these environments is from "below". These experiments were identical to the other 
experiments in the loss domain except the numeraire were switched from money to the lottery and 
the units were changed to accommodate the switch.6 If risk seeking behavior is present then
prices should be above the equilibrium price of 200. Thus the same theory of risk seeking that 
predicted below risk neutral prices now predicts prices above the risk neutral equilibrium price 
level. 
Four experiments were conducted with inexperienced and then experienced subjects. Because 
this switch in numeraire was evidently difficult for subjects, the processing and analysis of the data 
require more space than is available in this paper. However, the conclusion from analysis is that 
with experienced subjects some support exists for the presence of risk preferring subjects in this 
"inverted" environment. These data are not conclusive but they do help to reject any presumption 
that for some reason prices are always below risk neutral levels whether in the gains or losses. 
Prices of money in terms of the "insurance", when experienced people were used, tended to be 
above the risk neutral levels. 
A paradox can be observed in the .data. On one hand the individuals selected for experiment 0509 
continued to exhibit risk seeking behavior throughout the second experience. On the other hand 
data exists that suggest an evolution of risk attitudes when experience becomes a factor. In other 
words, for many subjects, the risk attitudes after experience, might be different from those 
initially. For example, Figures 7- 1 5  show that in most of the experiments price convergence was 
occurring in the training periods. The early prices were consistently lower suggesting that people 
were becoming more risk averse as they gained experience (and also faced actual payoffs). The 
following two conjectures represent an attempt to approach the problem of changing behavior 
with experience. The conjectures should not be interpreted as results but rather as a starting point 
of a discussion about this complex issue. 
5 Because prices are endogenous, the model i tself indicates that market experiments of the type studied here can 
only yield l imited opportun ities to classi fy indiv iduals according to preferences. Three individuals were sellers in  
the loss and buyers in  the gain clearly exh ibited the  asymmetry of  preferences suggested by extended prospect 
theory. One i ndividual was a buyer in loss and a buyer in gain so exhibited behavior that was consistent with 
asymmetric preferences but of course could also have been consistently risk averse. Two i ndividuals were sellers 
in the loss and buyers in the gain so were consistent with asymmetric preference but are also consistent with 
general risk seeking. Three individuals were buyers in the loss and buyers in the gains and thus cannot be 
classified at all s ince they are consistent with all modes of preference. 
6 m0 = 2000, x0= 1 0; Loss A = <  0 { Prob 1 /2 )  or $40 - ( l / l OO)m { prob 1 /2 } >, Loss B = $20 -x . The risk
neutral price of x in terms of m is 200. 
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CONJECTURE 1 .  Support of specific implications of the loss aversion axiom of prospect theory, 
such as an "endowment effect", "status quo bias" or "tradeoff vs. improvement" is stronger in 
the experiments involving inexperienced subjects and disappears with experience. 
SUPPORT. The result is a direct implication of the data presented in Table 8 .  The source of 
support is a comparison of the behavior of the subjects who participated in the experiments 03 16 ,  
03 1 7, 0501 ,  0502 and 0505 as inexperienced subjects, with their behavior when they participated 
in the experiments 0324 and 0509. The latter behavior was substantially different from the 
former. Such a difference in behavior of.the same people participating in the same experiment, 
suggests that experience matters. 
As was discussed in the support of Result 2, in the first set of experiments ( subjects were 
inexperienced ) the final holdings of eight of twenty subjects were near the origin ( less than 1 0  
units were traded ), implying status quo bias. In other words the status quo was the chosen option 
for the subjects. At the same time, however, the phenomena cannot be due to the status quo bias 
as derived from prospect theory. At the prices that existed in these markets, if people are risk 
seeking as they must be under the conditions of prospect theory from which the status quo bias is 
derived, the competitive equilibrium have individuals only on the boundaries selling insurance. 
Thus while a status quo bias is observed it cannot be due to prospect theory. At the same time, in  
the second set of experiments (subjects were experienced) the final holdings of only four of 
twenty subjects were near the origin, implying boundary final holdings as predicted by the 
competitive model and in agreement with other experiments. 
Moreover, fifteen of the twenty subjects increased the absolute values of their final holdings 
during their second experiment. The conclusion is that inexperienced the subjects in the 
experiments demonstrated a tendency to make very few changes in their holdings. With 
experience and understanding their behavior changed. Thus degree of experience and not a 
status quo bias derived from prospect theory accounts for their behavior.• 
The conjecture above suggests that when people do not feel confident about their understanding 
of a situation they will be conservative and chose inaction over action. It is possible to use 
prospect theory to explain such phenomena. The explanation could go as follows. A natural 
feature of uncertainty, as opposed to risk, is the possible existence of negative prospects that are 
possibly weighted so high that inaction results. With exposure to the decision environment comes 
a better understanding and as a consequence the imagined, possibly negative prospects disappear 
and the other features of the decision process emerge. While this explanation is crude, it appears 
that some such modification of prospect theory is necessary for the last result to be explained. 
The discussion and results above hold impl ications about the nature of circumstances under which 
prospect theory can be applied in its current form. Since the real prospect theory (and not the 
extended prospect theory examined here) is about a decision process, it might not be surprising if 
the nature of the axioms/laws of the process is subject to evolution with experience and 
understanding .  The conjecture developed next suggests that some of the central phenomena 
identified by prospect theory are not a stable features of human choice behavior. They go away 
with experience and perhaps with reflection. 
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CONJECTURE 2. With experience, risk seeking in the losses evolves into either risk neutral or 
risk averse behavior. 
SUPPORT. Price convergence from below in most experiments (Table 3) suggests that the 
incidence of risk seeking behavior is getting weaker as the experiment continues. The competitive 
model implies (Propositions 4-6), that the more RS subjects are in the system the less will be the 
equilibrium price and the more RA subjects are in the system the higher will be the equilibrium. 
Table 3 shows that the prices were consistently increasing in 7 out of 9 MN experiments . 
Although it is impossible to claim that Risk-Seeking behavior always disappears with experience, 
obvious tendencies of the phenomena were observed in four experiments .•  
The above conjectures are of  potential importance because they help isolate the nature of the 
decision process and its possible relationship to properties of an individual . Convergence in 
economic environments seems to occur at many different levels.  Clearly prices and quantities 
have a convergence property. However, individual decision rules seem to evolve and individual 
understanding of a situation and the attitudes of other individuals seem to undergo a 
transformation during the course of decisions and market activity. 
A hypothesis/philosophy has been advanced to describe this evolution , called the discovered 
preference hypothesis Plott, (forthcoming), and while that hypothesis is so simple that it is  not 
likely to survive close examination, the above two conjectures seem to be part of a pattern that 
the discovered preference hypothesis was advanced to capture. The idea is the individuals have a 
consistent set of preferences over states but such preferences only become known to the 
individual with thought and experience. Individuals at first exhibit a type of myopia, choosing in a 
somewhat impulsive way reflecting their immediate perceptions of their interests. With 
experience behavior moves toward patterns of choice behavior typical of the predictions of 
classical preference theory. Thus, when individuals are first given questions, they are 
characterized by a type of confusion. As they begin to formulate decisions while in this state they 
are influenced by "frames" in much the way that prospect theory asserts . As an understanding of 
the context evolves, the manifestation of the underlying preferences becomes more clearly 
observable in the data and decisions approach those of the classical theory of choice and 
preference. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
This research began with questions motivated by psychological research. Prospect theory has had 
a considerable impact on the decision li terature. The question posed by the research reported 
here was whether or not the predictions of an " extended prospect theory" could find support in 
markets .  
Exchange economies were created in which only losses could occur. Preferences over losses 
were not controlled in the unusual manner in which preferences are induced. Instead the objective 
was to determine if the "preferences revealed" by market actions had properties that one might 
expect from having studied the psychological based literature. 
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Risk seeking behavior in the loss domain was observed in the markets studied. Its existence lends 
support to two fundamental properties of prospect theory. First, since risk averse behavior has 
been widely documented in the positive domain in experimental markets, we can conclude that 
there is an asymmetry between gains and losses. A single control experiment reported in the 
paper further supports that pattern. That asymmetry is a fundamental property of prospect 
theory. As a corollary, we can conclude that there are such things as "gains" and "losses", as 
opposed to only "final states of the world", the existence of which implies the existence of 
another fundamental feature of prospect theory, a reference point. Finally, we can conclude that 
risk seeking in  the losses is a frequent occurrence. It was a property of over one third of the 
people observed in these markets. 
The patterns of results lend strong support to features of prospect theory as decision process. 
The more fundamental question to be posed is whether individuals are ONLY a bundle of decision 
processes, rules of thumb that have no necessary r�lationship to an underlying attitude or 
coherence of an underlying preference. First it should be emphasized that a pattern of coherence 
is evident in the markets. Convergence to understandable equilibria occurred. It follows that the 
"reference point" was not so subject to moment to moment "framing" that preferences became so 
labile that they had no coherence. These markets behaved as if a large proportion of individuals 
had reasonably coherent and stable preferences. Of course, a large proportion of these 
preferences were exactly of the form that one would have expected from a reading of prospect 
theory, as stated by the "extended prospect theory". 
Psychologists have long maintained that a relevant domain of prospect theory is "one time 
decisions". The results reported here support that presumption and stimulate a question regarding 
whether or not that is the only circumstance in which the theory applies . The conjectures 
reported here suggest that the first impulses experienced by a decision maker would seem to be 
described by the theory. Features of prospect theory are clearly present when people are 
confused. The support for the status quo bias is an example. The difference in behavior of those 
that give a risk seeking response to a questionnaire as opposed to those that give a risk averse 
response is another body of evidence that conservatism is a consequence of incomplete 
understanding .  After all, the theory is about a process of decision, so it is not particularly 
surprising that its features are most evident in situations in which individuals are involved in a 
process of decision. 
Whether or not "considered opinions" are governed by the same processes as are immediate 
impulses involves deeper and more complex experiments than have been performed to date. The 
final conjecture of the paper is that some of the features of prospect theory will disappear with 
practice or perhaps even with reflection. In particular, the conjecture is that risk seeking in the 
losses is a property of inexperience that wil l  give way to risk averse behavior. Of course one 
implication of the conjecture is that the concept and importance of a reference point will also fade. 
The idea that the evolution of attitudes has a direction toward the more classical lines of 
preference theory has been vigorously criticized (Kahneman, forthcoming) . Nevertheless, the 
data presented here provides additional support for such a presumption. 
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APPENDIX l 
Please answer the following questions reflecting your own preferences. There are no right 
or wrong answers to these questions .  
Q 1 :  Choose between winning 
A: $ 1000 with probability .5 
$0 with probability .5 
CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER: A 
Q2: Choose between winning 
C: $40 with probability .5 
$0 with probability .5 
CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER: c 
Q3: Choose between winning 
E: $4000 with probability .8 
$0 with probability .2 
CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER: E 
Q4: Choose between winning 
G: $ 1 5 with probabil ity .5 
$0 . with probabil ity .5 
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: G: 
Q5: Choose between winning 
B: $500 with certainty 
B 
D: $20 with certainty 
D 
F :  $3000 with certainty 
F 
H: $7.50 with certainty 
H: 
I: $2 with probabi lity .5 J: $ 1  with certainty 
$0 with probabi lity .5 
CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER: J 
Q6: Choose between losing 
K :  $ 1 000 with probabi lity .5 L: $500 with certainty 
$0 with probabil ity .5 
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: K L 
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Q7: Choose between losing 
M: $40 with probability .5  N: $20 with certainty 
$0 with probability .5  
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: M 
Q8: Choose between losing 
N 
0: $4000 with probability .8 P: $3000 with certainty 
$0 with probability .2 
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: 0 
Q9: Choose between losing 
p 
Q: $ 1 5  with probability .5 R: $7.50 with certainty 
$0 with probability .5 
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: Q 
Q 1 0: Choose between losing 
S: $2 with probability .5 
$0 with probability .5 
CHOOSE YOUR ANSWER: s 
R 
T: $ 1  with certainty 
T 
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APPENDIX 2 
Identification number _______ _ 
t =  _
_
_
_
 
_
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment. For your agreement to participate you will  
be paid $60. The structure of the experiment is such that you will be exposed to a 
possible money loss. The amount of loss will depend upon your decisions and the 
outcome of the lottery as will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
Your total money loss wi l l  consist of two different types of losses 
Total Loss = Loss A + Loss B 
Loss B will be determined as $20 minus your B-Dollar holdings. 
Loss A will be determined by the outcome of a lottery. The outcome of the lottery is 
determined by a single draw from an urn that contains equal number of RED and 
BLACK balls .  
If the drawn ball is a RED one then your Loss A is  zero. 
If the drawn ball is a BLACK one then your Loss A will be determined as $40 minus 
1 1 100 times your A-Cent holdings. 
The experiment will consist of a series of periods. At the beginning of each period you 
wil l be given 2000 A-Cents and l 0 B-Dol lars . The B-Dollars reduce your money Loss 
B. The A-Cents reduce your money Loss A should a BLACK ball be drawn but of 
course A-Cents are worth nothing to you should a RED ball be drawn. During the period 
you will be able to change the nature of your Losses by exchanging A-Cents for B­
Dollars and B-Dollars for A-Cents. 
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Each 1 B-Dollar held at the end of a period reduces your B-Loss by 1 $  and each 1 00 A­
Cents reduces your A Loss by $ 1  should a BLACK ball be drawn. 
As you may have noticed the chance that the drawn ball is BLACK is 112 or 50% and the 
chance that the drawn ball is  RED is also 112 or 50%. You may also have noticed that B­
Dollars are always worth something to you ( 1  B-Dollar reduces $ 1  of B Loss not 
depending of the outcome of the lottery) and that you need A-Cents only in 50% of cases 
( 1 00 A-Cents reduces $ 1  of A Loss only if a BLACK ball is drawn). 
As described above the maximum possible B Loss is  $20 ( happens if you have no B­
Dollars at all) , the maximum possible A Loss is $40 ( happens if you have no A-Cents at 
all and the BLACK ball is drawn). That implies that the maximum amount of A-Cents 
you may want to have is 4000 A-Cents and B-Dollars is 20 B-Dollars . 
The A-Cents that you have at any time are found in the CASH on HAND space on your 
computer screen .  The B-Dollars that you have are found in the INVENTORY space on 
your computer screen. So if you buy one unit of INVENTORY at a price P you give up P 
A-Cents and you acquire 1 B Dollar. If you sell one unit of INVENTORY at a price P 
you acquire P A-Cents and you give up 1 B-Dollar. 
The CASH ON HAND (A-Cents) and INVENTORY (B-Dollars) held at the end of a 
period will dictate the terms of your lottery that resulted from the trades you made during 
the period. These dictate the nature of your loss. Nothing can be transferred from one 
period to another. The trading in each period yields the terms of a specific lottery. 
The results of only one period will be used to determine your Loss. At the end of the 
experiment a special lottery will be held to determine which of several periods it will  be. 
In this special lottery each period will be given equal weight. 
EXAMPLE 1 
Suppose for example that you made no trades at al l  during the period. So your final 
holdings are the same as initial holdings : 2000 A-Cents ( CASH on HAND) and 10 B­
Dol lars (INVENTORY). 
If a BLACK ball is drawn you wou ld have lost: 
-------- A Loss ------------------- - - - - - - - - - - --------- B Loss ---------
$40 - 1 / 1 00 X 2000 (the A-Cent held) plus $20 - $ 1 0  ( the B-Dollars held) = $30 
If a RED bal l is drawn you would have lost: 
-------- A Loss - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - � - - - - - - - - - --------- B Loss ---------
$0 plus $20 - $ 1 0  ( the B-Dol lars held) = $ 1 0  
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After each period you will h ave to fil l  out the RECORD of LOSSES enclosed in your 
instruction folder. For example if in some period you acted as described in Example 1 
your RECORD of LOSSES should be as follows: 
Your Your Your Your Total Total 
Period # B-Dollar A-Cent B-Loss A-Loss loss if l oss if 
0 
0 
holding holding $20 minus $40 minus the ball the ball 
(Inventory) (Cash on . #B-Dollars #A-Cents is BLACK is  RED 
Hand) 1 00 (A+B) (A) 
Beg. 1 0 . 2000 $ 1 0  $20 $30 $ 10 
End. 1 0  2000 $ 10 $20 $30 $ 1 0  
EXAMPLE 2
Suppose now that during the period you have sold 8 B dollars at price 220 each. That 
means that your final holdings are: 2 B dollars ( 10  - 8) and 3760 A-Cents (2000+8x220). 
If a BLACK ball is drawn then you would have lost: 
$40-$37.6 (A Loss)+ $20-2 (B-Loss)=$20.4 (Total Loss) 
If a RED ball is drawn then you would have lost: 
$0 (A Loss)+ $20-2 (B-Loss)=$ 1 8  (Total Loss ) 
Your RECORD of LOSSES in this case should be filled out as follows: 
Your Your Your Your Total Total 
Period # B-Dollar A-Cent B-Loss A-Loss loss if loss if 
0 
0 
holding holding $20 minus $40 minus the ball the ball 
(Inventory) (Cash on #B-Dollars #A-Cents is BLACK is RED 
Hand) 1 00 (A+B )  (A) 
Beg. 1 0  2000 $ 1 0 $20 $30 $ 1 0  
End. 2 3760 $ 1 8 $2.4 $20.4 $ 1 8
The above the example shows how you may change the nature of your losses by selling 
B-Dollars compared to making no actions at all (Example 1 ) .  Namely in the Example_l 
your gains were the fol lowing: 
50% chance of losing $30 ( a  BLACK ball is Drawn) 
30 
Real 
total 
loss 
Real 
total 
loss 
50% chance of losing $ 10 (a RED ball is drawn) 
After selling 1 5  B Dollars at the price of 50 each ( Example 2 ) your losses are 
determined as : 
50% chance of losing $20.4 ( a BLACK ball is drawn) 
50% chance of losing $ 1 8  (a RED ball is drawn) 
Now you can see how your actions during the experiment may change the n ature of your 
losses. 
EXAMPLE 3. 
Suppose that during the period you bought 1 0  B-Dollars at a price 1 90 each. That 
means that your final holdings are: 1 00 A-Cents ( 2000- 1 0x 190) and 20 B-Dollars 
( 1 0+ 1 0) .  
If a BLACK ball i s  drawn you would have lost: 
$40- 1 (A Loss) + $20-20 (B Loss )= $39 (Total Loss) 
If a RED ball is drawn you would have lost: 
$ 0 (A Loss) + $20-20 (B Loss )= $0 (Total Loss) 
So your losses in thi� example are the following: 
50% chance of losing $39 (a BLACK bal l is drawn ) 
50% chance of losing $0 (a RED bal l is drawn) 
Your RECORD of Losses should be fi l led out as fol lows: 
Your Your Your Your Total Total 
Period # B-Dollar A-Cent B-Loss A-Loss loss if loss if 
holding holding $20 minus $40 minus the ball the bal l 
(Inventory) (Cash on #B-Dollars #A-Cents is BLACK is RED 
Hand) J OO (A+B) (A) 
0 Beg. 1 0 2000 $ 1 0 $20 $30 $ 1 0  
0 End. 20 1 00 $0 $39 $39 $0 
3 1  
Real 
total 
loss 
Compare it to the losses from Examples 1 and 2. 
Exercise 1. 
Suppose that during the period you sold 9 B-Dollars at the price of 2 1 0  each. 
Compute 
i .  Your final B-Dollar holding-----------------
i i . Your final A-Cent holding ---------------
i i i . Your A Loss 
-----------------------
iv. Your B Loss 
---------------------
v. Your Total Loss if a BLACK ball is drawn 
-----------� 
vi. Your Total Loss if a RED ball is drawn 
-----------
S o  your final lottery is 
50% chance of losing ______ _ 
50% chance of losing ______ _ 
vii. Fil l  out the RECORD of Losses for the above case.
Your Your Your Your Total 
Period # B-Dol lar A-Cent B-Loss A-Loss loss if 
holding holding $20 minus $40 minus the ball 
(Inventory) (Cash on #B-Dollars #A-Cents is BLACK 
Hand) J OO (A+B) 
0 Beg. 
0 End. 
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Total Real 
loss if total 
the ball loss 
is  RED 
(A) 
Exercise 2. 
Repeat Exercise 1 for the case when during a period you bought 6 B-Dollars at the price 
of 1 80 each. 
i .  Your final B-Dollar holding-----------------
i i . Your final A-Cent holding ________________ _ 
iii . Your A Loss-----------------------
iv. Your B Loss 
-------------------� 
v. Your Total Loss if a BLACK ball is drawn 
------------
vi. Your Total Loss if a RED ball is drawn ____________ _ 
So your final lottery is  
50% chance of losing 
______ 
_ 
50% chance of losing 
______ 
_ 
vii. Fil l  out the RECORD of Losses for the above case:
Your Your Your Your Total Total 
Period # B-Dollar A-Cent B-Loss A-Loss loss if loss if 
holding holding $20 minus $40 minus the ball the ball 
(Inventory) (Cash on #B-Dollars #A-Cents is BLACK is RED 
Hand) 1 00 (A+B) (A) 
0 Beg. 
0 End. 
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APPENDIX 3. Proofs. 
SUPPORT of the PROPOSITION 1 .  The indifference curves are determined by the following equation: 
0.5U(m/1 00 - 20) + 0.5 U(m/100 - 20 + x - 40) = C, ( 1 )  
were 0 ::;; m � 2000 and 0 s; x � 40 are the money M and the inventory X holdings respectively by  the end of  a 
period. To determine the shape of the indifference curves x' m and x" mm are to be computed. By differentiating 
both sides by m we get: 
O .OlU'(m/100-20) + U'(m/100+ x - 60) ( x'm + O.Dl ) = 0 (2) 
x' = -0.01 - O.OlU'(m/100-20)/U'(x + m/100 - 60) (3) m 
Differentiating both sides of (2) by m implies: 
0.01 U"(m/1 00-20) + 100U"(m/100+x-60)(x' m+ 1 )
2 
+ 100U'(m/100+x-60)x" mm = 0
(4) 
Substitution of (3) into (4) gives: 
x" =(- 10-4)/U'(m/1OO+x-60)[U"(m/l 00-20)+U"(m/1 OO+x-60) { U'(m/100-20)/U"(m/1OO+x-60) }
2
J mm 
(5) 
By substituting into (5) the properties of the derivatives listed in the hypothesis of the proposition the first three 
conclusions of the proposition follow immediately. One may also notice that for all types of subjects 
U'(x=40, m=O)= -0.02 and -0.01 � U'( x, m=20) � -0.02. (6) 
From this the fourth conclusion of the proposition follows.•  
Proof of  the PROPOSITION 3 .  Figure 4 shows the shape of  the total excess demand in this case. 
For every i, since all subjects are risk averse, Q;(50)=20>0 and Q;(+oo)<O, and D(50)>0 and D(+oo)<O. 
The continuity of Q;(p) implies the continuity of D(p), which in turn implies that there exists p* such that 
50<p*<+oo and D(p*)=O. • 
Proof of the PROPOSITION 4. Figure 5 shows how the total excess demand changes if N (N:?:A) risk neutral 
subjects are added to the system. For the risk neutral subjects the excess demand function takes values in the 
interval from -20 to +20 (Q;(50)=[-20;20] ) . .  For the risk averse subjects Q;(50)=20. Thus at price p=50 the total 
excess demand correspondence is equal to the interval [d 1 ;d2] .  That i s  D(50) = [d1 ;d2] , where d 1=-20N+20A and 
d2=20(A+N). If A>N then 0<d1<d2 and the proposition is reduced to the Proposition 3. If As;N then d1 s;Os;d2 . The 
proposition is proved , since at the price of 50 the total excess demand function has a value of 0 (OE D(50) = 
[d 1 ;d2]) . • 
Proof of the PROPOSITION 5 . .  Figure 6 shows the total excess demand function when S,A and N are greater than 
0. 
Notation: 
Il={p1  , .  . .  , P1.} - set points of discontinuity of D{p) ( P;<50 for any j and Ls;S) in increasing order. 
ni is the number of the individuals whose demand is discontinuous at pi E 0 
We need to prove that there exist a p* such that D(p*)=O. 
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Let us note that D(oo) < 0. 
First, let us determine the total excess demand D(p) at p=50. By definition D(p)=LQJp). For the risk neutral 
subjects QiC50)E [-20;20]. For the risk averse subjects QiC50)=20. For the risk seeking subjects Qi(50)=-20. 
Repeating the similar argument in Proposition 4, at p=50 D(50) = [d1 ;d2] where d1= -20(N+S)+20A, d2=-
20S+20(A+N). 
If d2>0 (S<A+N) then for the two possible cases (d1:s; 0 < d2 and O<d1:s;d2) the proof is similar to the proofs of the 
Proposition 3 and 4. The equilibrium price is greater than or equal to 50. 
If d2=0 (S=A+N) then 50 there exist multiple equilibria. First, notice that 50 is an equilibrium price. Secondly, if 
the price is above 50 then supply is always greater than demand. Therefore no equilibria exist. On the other hand 
if the price falls  a little below 50 then demand is still equal to supply. This continues until all risk seeking people 
are willing to sell .  Therefore there exist an interval [a ; 50] of equilibrium prices, where 0 < a <  50. 
Finally, let us consider the case when d2<0 i.e. S>A+N. 
The correspondence D(p) is strictly positive at the price equal to 0 (D(0)=20(N+S+A),  strictly negative at the price 
equal to 50 (D(50) = [d1 ;d2] and d2<0 ) and has L points of discontinuity at the interval [0;50]. It will be shown 
that the set of the values of D(p) on the above interval is a set of S+ 1 consecutive integers from 40K1 to 40KL, 
where K1=(N+A+S)/2 (positive) and KL=(A+N-S)/2 (negative). 
Secondly, let us construct D(p)=LQ1(p) for pE [0,50). For the risk averse and risk neutral subjects Q1(p)=20 if 
pE [0,50). Thus, the only subjects whose excess demand functions have different values in the interval are risk 
seeking ones. For a risk seeking subject Q1(p )= { 20 if p<pi, -20 if p>pi' 20 or -20 if p=p) , where piE IT. This implies
that D(p) is constant in any open interval (pi;pi+ 1) .  One may notice that there are L+ 1 such intervals, since there 
are L points of discontinuity. Let us denote D(p )=40Ki if pE (pH ;pi). At p=pi' ni of risk seeking subjects are 
indifferent between +20 and -20. Thus, the total excess demand of those ni subjects at the price p equal to pi is  the 
set of ni+ 1 integers: { 20ni, 20nf40, . . .  , -20ni } .  Moreover, the total excess demand of the same ni subjects is equal 
to 20ni if p is less than pi and is equal to -20ni if p is greater than Pr The total excess demand of everybody else is 
constant near Pr This implies that D(pf£)-D(pi+£)=40(Ki.1-Ki)=20nf(-20)ni=40ni . Thus all Ki can be determined by 
induction. Formally: 
where K; is defined as follows: 
K1=(A+N+S)/2 [ Positive Integer, since there is an even number of subjects] 
Ki.1=Ki - ni 
If pE IT; p=pi then 
Thus at the interval [0;50) D(p) has the following values: 
40K" 40(K1- l )  , . . . . , 40KL, where K1=(A+N+S)/2>0 and K1.=K1-Lni=K1-S=(A+N-S)/2 < 0 . This implies that one 
of the values is zero. 
The proposi tion is proved. • 
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Table 1 
Summary of the experiments. 
Date Location Experienced 
Sub 'ects 
022894 USC No 
03 1 694 USC No 
03 1 794 USC No 
032494 USC Yes1 
042894 CALTECH No 
050 1 95 CALTECH No 
050295 CALTECH No 
050595 CALTECH No 
050995 CALTECH Yes2 
1 Subjects who were used in 032494 participated previously in 03 1 6  or 03 1 7. 
2 Subjects who were used in 050995 were among those who demonstrated risk-seeking behavior while 
participating in 0501 95,  050295 or 050595. 
J Subjects who were used in 05 1 695 were the same subjects who participated in 050995. 
52 
Table 2.  
Competitive equilibrium predictions. 
Subjects A>S+N S>N+A S�N+A 
S=number of RS subjects A�S+N 
A=number of RA subjects 
N=number of RN subjects 
Existence of a competitive Exists. Even number of Exists. 
equilibrium. subjects is a 
sufficient 
condition. 
Equilibrium price >50 <50 5 0  
Equilibrium personal net �20 =20 �20 
trades 
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Table 3 .  
Average transaction prices. 
Period# · Experiment 
0 
1 
2 5 1 .85 49. 4 1  48. 8 1  4 1 .98 
3 56. 1 4  26.34 44.21  39 .48 48.37 50.57 48 . 1 8  46.90 43 .35 
4 43 .33 24. 1 7  44. 83 4 1 .27 49. 1 5  5 1 .20 49.20 45.70 40.77 
5 42.75 45. 1 2 43 .69 48.41 49.65 49.63 44.24 4 1 .58 
6 39 .61  48.36 44. 88 49.04 50.67 49. 84 46.92 4 1 .5 1  
7 46.03 50.42 49. 1 7  47.57 42.47 
8 47 .37 47 . 1 8  
Practice Periods 
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Table 4. 
Ordinary least square estimation of the convergence process.  
Equation: PIT= Bu Di (lff) + ... + BiK DK (lff) + B2 ( (T-l)ff) + u 
I - index of the experiment, T - period number. 
PIT - average transaction price in period T of experiment I. 
DJ =  1 if i=j ,  0 otherwise. 
u - N(O,s2) 
Dependent variable- PIT 
Experiment Independent Estimated Standard 
variable Coefficient Error 
022894 B 1 1 50.32 2.86 
03 1 694 B 1 2  2 1 .07 3 .03 
03 1 794 B 1 3  44.35 2.86 
032494 B 1 4  39.02 2.82 
042894 B i s  49.57 2.87 
050 1 95 B 1 6 54.74 2.8 1 
050295 B 1 1  48 .33 2. 8 1  
050595 B i s  49.47 2.84 
050995 B 1 9 39.68 2.77 
B2 46. 1 1 0.84 
Number of observations - 49 
R-squared - 0. 7 1 
Standard Error of the Regression - 3 . 38 
Durbin-Watson Statistics - 1 .78 
Mean of dependent variable - 45.66 
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t-Statistics 
1 7 .58 
6.95 
1 5 .50 
1 3 .82 
1 7 . 32 
1 9.43 
1 7 . 1 6  
1 7 .57 
1 4.08 
54.28 
Table 5 .  
Standard deviations of transaction prices . 
Period# Experiment 
0 
1 
2 
3 1 5 .82 1 0.85 4.75 9 .44 5 .64 1 .0 1  3 . 3 8  3 .43 1 0.29 
4 1 1 .39 1 0.30 3 .48 9.46 .73 .77 5 : 1 4  1 .59 2 .04 
5 9.23 3 . 8 1  2.36 5.23 1 .25 1 . 1 0  .83 2.28 
6 9.46 1 . 3 1  3.92 1 .05 .93 1 .23 1 .27 1 . 1 9 
7 1 .73 .64 .46 .94 1 .3 6  
8 .72 .73 
Practice Periods 
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TABLE 6.  
Numbers of individuals with various levels of purchases and sales : average 
of last two periods, all experiments. 
All Experiments Combined · 
Final Total 
Holdings 0-0.4 0.5-4 5-8 9- 1 2  1 3- 1 6  1 7-20 Numbers 
BUYERS 4 2 5 7 8 1 4  40 
SELLERS 6 4 5 7 1 6  38 
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Table 7 .  
Total Net Trade Volumes. 
Period# Experiment 
0 
1 
2 
3 38 32 64 55 54 54 7 1  23 80 
4 54 34 62 55 55 62 70 50 90 
5 26 60 48 60 67 53 43 88 
6 42 56 5 1  55 76 60 40 93 
7 52 78 73 40 83 
8 50 40 
Competitive 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 80 1 00 80 60 1 00 
Equilibrium 
Predictions 
Practice Periods 
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TABLE 8 .  
Comparison of the net changes of final holdings ( average of the last two periods ) and 
classification results for the subjects who participated in two experiments 
Subject # Inexperienced Experienced 
Experiment Net Classification Experiment Net Classification 
changes changes 
of final of final 
holdings holdings 
of of 
inventory inventory 
1 03 1 6  6.5 "?" 0324 8 . 5  "?" 
2 03 1 6  0.5 "?" 0324 0 "?" 
3 03 1 6  1 0.5  RA 0324 1 2  RA 
4 03 1 6  -5 "?" 0324 - 1 9  RS 
5 03 1 6  -3 .5 "?" 0324 9 .5  "?" 
6 03 1 6  -3 "?" 0324 - 15 RS 
7 03 1 6  - 1  "?" 0324 0 "?" 
8 03 1 7  - 1 3 . 5  RS 0324 - 1 7  RS 
9 03 1 7  -3 "?" 0324 1 1  RA 
1 0  03 1 7  0 " ?" 0324 1 0  RA 
1 1  050 1  - 1 3 .5 RS 0509 20 RA 
1 2  050 1  - 1 2 RS 0509 3 1 .5 RA 
1 3  050 1  - 1 2.5 RS 0509 -20 RS 
1 4  050 1  - 1 4 RS 0509 -20 RS 
15 0502 - 1 7  RS 0509 20 RA 
1 6  0502 -20 RS 0509 20 RA 
1 7  0502 - 1 9.5 RS 0509 -20 RS 
1 8  0502 20 RA 0509 19 .5  RA 
1 9  0505 -20 RS 0509 - 1 2.5 RS 
20 0505 - 1 7.5 RS 0509 - 1 8  RS 
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Table 9 .  
Classification o f  the subjects according to 
their behavior. 
Experiment RA* Rs·· ? 
0228 3 3 4 
03 1 6  2 1 7 
03 1 7  3 . 3  4 
0324 3 3 4 
0428 2 2 4 
050 1  4 4 2 
0502 3 3 2 
0505 2 2 2 
0509 5 5 0 
Total 27 26 29 
· These measures are upper bounds . 
.. These measures are lower bounds . 
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Table 1 0. 
Relationship between answers to the questionnaires and experimental behavior 
Type I classification. 
More than 2 out of 5 answers of a particular type. 
Risk-Seeking in the Risk-Averse in the 
Questionnaires Questionnaires 
Risk-Seeking in the 1 6  2 
Experiment 
Risk-A verse in the 1 0  1 0  
Experiment 
"?" in the Experiment 28 7 
Type II classification. 
B ased on the answer to the choice of loosing $20 for sure or $40 with p= l/2 
Risk-Seeking in the Risk-A verse in the 
Questionnaires Questionnaires 
Risk-Seeking in the 1 7  · 2  
Experiment 
Risk-Averse in the 1 1  8 
Experiment 
"?" in the Experiment 2 1 1 4  
6 1  
